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ABSTRACT
The adoption of flat tax systems in Central and Eastern European
countries have often been supported by arguments of simplicity, higher
compliance and lower distortionary effects. However, since income
inequality is high in these countries, the question of introducing some
progressivity has come to the fore in both policy and academic circles. In
this paper, we combine microsimulation and macro models to analyze
the effects of moving from a flat to a progressive tax system and we find
that a reduction in income inequality can be achieved with positive,
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1. Introduction
Many developing and transition economies have moved away from complex, progressive tax
systems to simpler tax schedules, with fewer tax brackets and lower top statutory marginal tax
rates (Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan 2010). Keen, Kim, and Varsano (2008) show
that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have been especially active in this respect.
They identify two waves of adopted flat taxschemes: the first wave (in the 1990s), including the
Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), is characterized by tax rates set at moderately
high levels (or close to the highest marginal tax prior to the reform), while the second wave (in
the 2000s) started in Russia, followed by Romania and Hungary, and is marked by tax rates
that are instead closer to the lowest of the pre-reform rates. In most transition economies, the
flat tax was introduced with the purpose of simplifying the tax system, reducing tax evasion
and improving economic efficiency through lower tax distortions. It should be noted, how-
ever, that progressivity is only one dimension of complexity in the tax system. The existence of
numerous tax deductions, including allowances and credits, tend to be more important in this
regards as they make the effective tax burden less transparent and add both to the cost of tax
compliance and to the administrative burden for tax authorities, see Kalyva et al. (2014).
The implementation of flat tax rates has produced diverse results. For example, in Russia,
the replacement of a progressive tax system by a flat one, in 2001, was followed by a significant
growth in tax revenue, due to higher compliance and reporting (see Gorodnichenko,
Martinez-Vazquez, and Sabirianova Peter 2009). Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm (2005) argue,
however, that it is unclear whether this was due to the parametric reforms or to accompanying
changes in enforcement. Slovakia also introduced a flat tax reform in 2004 and Remeta et al.
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(2015) find a number of weaknesses which became apparent over time, noting in particular
lower levels of tax revenues and tax compliance, as a result of a weak tax administration and
high social security contribution (SSC) rates. In a recent study covering a larger set of
transition countries, Filer et al. (2019) find no significant effect of flat tax reforms on income
underreporting. They contend that this may be due to a parallel deterioration in attitudes
toward the public sector in these countries. Recently, Saavedra,Marcincin, andValachy (2007)
analyzed the impact of flat tax reforms in Central and Eastern European countries on tax
revenues, tax structures and tax compliance. While they found no influence on tax revenues
collected, they do however find that flat tax reforms lead to a shifting of the tax system toward
indirect taxes (including consumption taxes). They also find some evidence of a positive
impact on tax compliance although only in the cases where the personal and corporate income
flat tax rates were aligned.
Most CEE countries introduced or increased tax allowances and tax credit in parallel to the
adoption of flat personal income tax (PIT) systems. Country-specific studies simulating the
impact of flat tax reforms in European countries find that rather small efficiency gains were
achieved, while coming at the price of an increase in inequality (see, in particular, Caminada
and Goudswaard 2001; Decoster and Orsini 2007; González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas
2006). Nonetheless, the impact of moving from a progressive to a flat tax system on income
inequalities remains unclear. For instance, Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2016) find that
progressivity reduces inequality in observed income, but has a significantly smaller impact on
actual inequality approximated by consumption-based Gini indices. Furthermore, this differ-
ential effect is found to bemuch larger in countries with weaker institutions. In a recent paper,
Horvath et al. (2015) also investigate the consequences of hypothetical reforms of the personal
income tax system toward a progressive tax system in Slovakia. The authors find that the
overall economic and fiscal impact of such reforms would be moderate. They contend that
only radical reforms would generate significant output and employment losses. Keen et al.
(2008) raise questions on the sustainability of flat tax systems, given also the increasing
pressures stemming from the difficulty of taxing internationally mobile capital. The global
trend toward increased income inequalities within countries has also been especially pro-
nounced in the CEE countries (most notably the Baltics, Bulgaria and Romania) due to the
transition to market economies, see Lakner and Milanovic (2016). This raises concerns on the
role played by flat tax systems in reducing inequalities or cushioning against economic shocks
through automatic stabilization (see Fuest, Peichl, and Schaefer 2008; Tóth 2013).
In this paper we analyze the impact of hypothetical progressive tax reforms from three
main angles considering their redistributive, fiscal, employment and growth impacts. The
optimal tax literature provides the theoretical background for analyzing the relative virtues of
flat vs. progressive tax systems from an equity/efficiency perspective (see, in particular,
Mirrlees and Adam 2010). This theory posits that the optimal design of tax systems should
maximize social welfare subject to the government budget constraint, while taking into
account behavioral responses affecting labor, saving or consumption decisions. Accordingly,
a given tax system may promote greater equity through income redistribution (e.g. through
progressive tax rates), but distorts agents´ behavior, therefore increasing the deadweight cost
(or efficiency cost) of policy interventions. The most recent contributions have focused on the
distortive nature of progressive tax systems toward labor supply, (see Benabou 2002; Diamond
and Saez 2011; Kalíšková 2014; Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante 2017).1 An important
recommendation in this respect is that policies should correct the combined negative effects of
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high marginal tax rates and generous social benefits (present in most developed economies)
on labor supply, see Diamond and Saez (2011) for a review.2 The existing evidence suggests
indeed that the deadweight cost of highmarginal tax rates on low-income/low skill individuals
is especially high and dominated by the distortion exerted by the tax-benefit system on the
decision to work, i.e. the so-called extensive margin of labor supply, see for instance Blundell
(2012) for a discussion.3 Following this line of arguments, it can be socially desirable to
subsidize low income/low skilled individuals through working tax credits, see for instance
Immervoll et al. (2007) for a specific analysis in the European case. Barrios et al. (2018) showed
in addition that working tax credits might also prove efficient from a fiscal perspective in
presence of progressive tax systems given that the fiscal cost (through public expenditures or
tax revenue losses) entailed by these policies might be offset by the additional tax revenues
gains generated from the increase in employment.
While there is a general consensus on the desirability of working tax credits or, more
broadly speaking make work pay policies, their effectiveness depend on their design and
the institutional environment in which they are implemented. For instance, Bargain and
Orsini (2006) show that such policies fit better their purpose when considering family
conditions, rather than strictly individual factors, and when they are effectively targeted to
those categories most at risk of exclusion.4 Immervoll and Pearson (2009) stress also that
the effectiveness of make work pay policies can be conditioned by the existence of
minimum wages and wage subsidies.5 Finally, these authors note that these policies
need to be financed, which in the end might imply additional taxes, including for low-
income/low skilled workers.
The relative merits of flat vs. progressive tax systems with regards to growth have been
debated theoretically using dynamic models, see in particular Stokey and Rebelo (1995),
Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti, and Asea (1997) and Altig et al. (2001). Overall these analyses
show that assumptions regarding discount rates, preferences and labor supply responses
play an important role in determining growth outcomes. The empirical evidence remains
mixed on the impact of progressivity on economic growth, however, with earlier studies
such as Li and Sarte (2004) and Padovano and Galli (2002) finding a negative correlation
between the two variables, while more recent empirical analysis have suggested that
progressivity in tax systems might only have negligible impact, see Gerber et al. (2018).
In this paper we aim at providing novel cross-country evidence on these questions
considering hypothetical reforms introducing/increasing progressivity in countries featur-
ing flat tax systems. We analyze the fiscal, redistributive and macroeconomic impact of
such reforms in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Romania.6 Our
approach is resolutely empirical and starts from the actual tax structures of the aforemen-
tioned countries. In order to do so we use EUROMOD, the European microsimulation
model for the EU, exploiting two important features of this model. First, EUROMOD
models countries´ tax and social benefit systems in a consistent way, in particular in
reference to the definition of gross income. This brings a clear advantage for analyzing the
redistributive impact of tax reforms in comparable manner across countries (see
Sutherland and Figari 2013). Second, EUROMOD embeds tax allowances and tax credits
in the determination of the final disposable income. This is especially relevant when
assessing actual tax systems which, like in the cases considered here, often feature such
special tax provisions and exceptions.
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We also combine EUROMOD with the macroeconomic model QUEST in order to
provide a joint analysis of the redistributive and growth impact of progressive tax reforms
in flat tax countries. We follow in particular the approach developed by Barrios et al.
(2019) whereby both these models are combined by calibrating the QUEST model with
parameters derived from EUROMOD for what concerns personal income and tax struc-
tures, participation rates and labor supply elasticities. Following this approach, the precise
design of policy reforms are first simulated in EUROMOD and then incorporated into
QUEST in order to obtain the macroeconomic second round effects (including on
employment, GDP and prices) The second-round effects (in particular regarding price,
wage and employment effects) are then incorporated in the microsimulation model in
order to assess the medium-term projections in PIT revenues.
Our contribution to the existing literature is threefold. First, our analysis is, to the best of
our knowledge, the first study to consider such hypothetical reform scenarios in a consistent
way across different countries, allowing us to draw more general conclusions about the
potential economic impact of progressive tax reforms. Our results are therefore informative
from both a policy and theoretical perspectives, illustrating how hypothetical (or theoretical)
reforms would impact countries taking into account their specific (pre-reform) tax
structures. Second, we are able to assess the potential equity impact of progressive tax reforms
based on the use of a microsimulation model and household-level data together with their
fiscal and macroeconomic effects, including on growth and employment. The assessment of
employment effects is particularly relevant given the potential distortionary impact of tax
reforms on labor supply highlighted in the recent theoretical literature. Third, our analysis
considers actual tax benefits systems, including wherever relevant existing tax allowances and
tax credits. These tax components can significantly influence the redistributive impact of flat
tax systems, introducing de facto a certain level of progressivity. This allows us to qualify our
results depending on country-specific characteristics.
We simulate three policy reform scenarios which are themselves motivated by the main
lessons drawn from the theoretical and empirical literatures. The results of these simulations
are then compared with the 2017 policy baseline. In a first scenario, we consider the
introduction of a progressive personal income tax rate schedule. We then analyze the
introduction of a refundable in-work tax credit in order to neutralize the budgetary effects
of the first scenario and to tackle the potential disincentive effects on labor supply. Finally, we
analyze an alternative reform introducing a basic tax-free allowance (or increasing an existing
allowance wherever relevant) with a gradual phasing out, compensated by an increase in the
flat personal income tax rate, which would also result in being budget neutral. The first
scenario provides a first assessment of the fiscal and equity implications of the progressive tax
reforms without compensating measures. The second and third scenarios implement, in
addition, alternative budget neutral reforms which are further considered into a macro-
model, in order to gauge their impact on GDP and employment.
Our results suggest that introducing progressive tax reforms would have positive effects on
redistribution and equity in all countries considered although to a varying extent depending
on country-specific tax systems. The role played by existing tax allowances and tax credits is
found to be particularly relevant in this respect. In the medium-term, the macroeconomic
impact of the budget-neutral reforms appears to be positive for all countries. The results show
that cutting taxes for low (medium) income individuals increases their incentives for being
employed, while raising taxes on high income earners lowers their employment rate. These
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counteracting forces lead to a relatively modest impact on employment and GDP. Embedding
the second-round effects in the microsimulation model slightly decreases the medium-term
projections on personal income tax revenues, mainly due to a negative wage effect for low
(medium) income workers which counterbalances the hike in employment for these cate-
gories. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the current tax
system of the countries considered in our analysis. In Section 3, we define the policy reform
scenarios designed to introduce/increase progressivity in the tax schedule. In Section 4, we
analyze the macroeconomic impact of the budget neutral scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
2. Personal Income Tax Systems in 2017
In 2017 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary had a flat PIT rate.7 The
Baltic countries were the first to introduce flat tax systems among the countries considered in
this paper: Estonia and Lithuania introduced such a system in 1994 followed by Latvia in 1997
(Table 1). These countries initially set their single PIT rate at rather high level, close to the top
tax rates of their previous progressive systems: 26% for Estonia, 33% for Lithuania and 25% for
Latvia. These countries were then followed by Romania (2005), Bulgaria (2008) and Hungary
(2011). However, by contrast with the Baltic countries, the single PIT rates in this second
group of countries were set equal to the minimum marginal tax rate of the progressive tax
system previously in place, as in the case of Bulgaria, or even below that level, as in the case of
Romania (16% vs. 18%) and Hungary (16% vs. 17%). Interestingly so, the Baltic countries
decided later to further reduce their tax rate: from 33% to 15% for Lithuania, from 25% to 23%
in Latvia and from 26% to 20% in Estonia.
However, despite having adopted seemingly similar tax systems, the six countries have
rather different PIT structures if one accounts for the different definitions of the tax bases
and the existence of tax allowances and tax credits which were in many instances
introduced to compensate for the negative redistributive impact of flat tax systems,
introducing de facto a certain degree of progressivity. Table 2 provides an overview of
the definition of the tax base and existing tax allowances and tax credits simulated in
EUROMOD and affecting the PIT in place in 2017. Basic tax allowances can in some
instances be universal (as in Estonia, Bulgaria or Hungary) or differentiated by employ-
ment income (as in Romania, Lithuania and Latvia). Bulgaria and Hungary had no basic
tax allowance in 2017.8
Two recent papers have analyzed more specifically the redistributive and fiscal impact
of tax expenditures9 in EU countries making use of the EUROMOD model. Barrios et al.
(2016) makes use EUROMOD to assess these effects for selected tax expenditures related
to households´ spending. This paper shows that housing, health and education related tax
Table 1. Personal income tax rates, before and after the introduction of the flat tax.
BG EE HU LT LV RO
Currency BGN EUR HUF EUR EUR RON
Year 2008 1994 2011 1994 1997 2005
Before introduction 10% – 24% 16% – 35% 17% – 32% 18% – 33% 10% – 25% 18% – 40%
After introduction 10% 26% 16% 33% 25% 16%
2017 10% 20% 16% 15% 23% 16%
Source: EUROMOD country reports.
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Table 2. Tax base definition and tax allowances and tax credits (2017).
Taxable income Tax allowances and tax credits
BG Employment and self-employment income and property. - A standard child allowance amounting to BGN200
per year for one child, BGN400 for two and BGN600 for
three or more children.
– Tax deductions are provided for permanently disabled
persons, voluntary social, unemployment, health and
life insurances.
- Deductible expenses include private pension
contributions, income from rent and from freelance
activities.
- Deductions of bequests are applied for sponsoring
cultural events, NGOs and the National Fund “Children’s
Health”.
EE Employment income, sickness benefit, different public
and private pensions, maternity, paternity,
unemployment insurance benefits, royalties, income from
rent and income from self-employed.
- Universal basic tax allowance of €180 per month.
- Allowances for kids, pension allowance, and allowance
for self-employment income from agriculture.
- Tax allowance for spouse (up to €2160 per year),
which is conditional on the level of joint taxable income
of the married couple.
- Tax deductions for housing loan interest payments,
study loans, contributions to the third pillar pension.
HU The taxable income includes all sources of income
excluding pensions, child and family benefits as well as
EVA (Simplified Entrepreneurial Tax) payers self-
employment income (which is used only for calculating
social insurance contributions but not for calculating
taxes).
- No basic allowance in Hungary. There is only a Family
tax allowance (since 2012) that depends on the number
of kids.
- Tax credit for serious disability for people
with a disability level of at least 67%.
LT The tax base is derived from gross income by deducting
the following components: non- taxable income (all state
social assistance and some social insurance benefits, etc.),
income received from activities conducted under
a business certificate, allowable deductions related to
income from individual activities, the acquisition price of
property and expenses related to it, basic and additional
tax allowances (for families with children, disabled,
farmers, etc.), particular expenses incurred by a resident
(when calculating taxable income of fiscal year)
- Basic tax allowance is €310 and has a phase out of 0.5.
- Additional allowances for parents raising children, and
disabled people.
- Deductible expenses includes life insurance payments,
voluntary pension contributions, payments for studies,
interest paid on loans taken for housing before 2009.
LV Employment income, sickness benefits, self-employment
income, income from property, income from capital,
different public pensions, and other income receive by
children under 16. Since 2016, Latvia has also a solidarity
tax applied to incomes above €48,600 per year.
Effectively, the solidarity tax substitutes the social
insurance contributions on high incomes.
- Tax allowance differentiated with respect to the level
of income. The maximum basic allowance is €118 and
the minimum €60.
- Other tax allowances include allowance for pensioners,
allowance for a dependent (child, spouse or parent), for
the disabled people, for politically repressed person,
employee and for self-employed contributions and
solidarity tax payments.
- Deductible expenses include: expenses on education,
health services, contributions to private pensions funds,
life insurance premiums and etc.
RO Employment and self-employment income, income from
investment and property, public and private pensions,
contributory sickness and unemployment benefits and
severance payments.
- Employee tax allowance amounts to a maximum of
RON800 per month and has a phase-out slope of 0.5.
- Tax allowance for pensioners up to RON2,000 per
month.
- Deductible expenses include private voluntary pension
contributions, trade union fees and savings in collective
systems for dwelling expenses.
- An amount up to 2% of the personal income tax paid
on employee and self-employed income can be
donated to nonprofit organizations or for private
scholarships.
Sources: EUROMOD Country reports.
Country notes: (LT) and (EE) In the simulations, we distinguish the withholding income tax liability (used for simulating
social assistance) from the final tax liability (which has a broader taxable base, including income from self-employment,
income received by farmers, from property sale, dividends, gambling, deductible expenses and unused tax allowances).
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expenditures in the countries considered here tend to favor higher income deciles,
although this effect is relatively small compared to what is observed in other EU countries
in both fiscal and equity terms. Avram (2018) also makes use of EUROMOD to analyze
the fiscal and redistributive impact of tax allowances and tax credits. She finds that the
redistributive effect of these tax components tend to be small. She also shows that other
features of the tax system, such as the tax rate schedule and the definition of tax units,
tend to have significantly larger redistributive impact.
The redistributive properties CEE countries tax systems should be gauged considering
social security contributions too. As a matter of fact, the PIT accounts for less than a third
of the implicit tax rate on labor for most countries (Figure 1). Employee and employer
social security contributions, which constitute a much higher share of labor taxes, are
often proportional and can be capped in some countries, making them slightly regressive.
A clear advantage of using EUROMOD in this respect is that social benefits are considered
together with PIT (including tax allowances and credits), and employee and employer
social security contributions in order to determine households´ disposable income.
Table 3 provides a snapshot of effective tax rates, inequality and redistribution through
the tax systems in CEE countries compared to the rest of the EU. The evidence provided
therein suggests that EU flat tax countries tend to have lower average and marginal tax
rates compared to the rest of the EU. At the same time, these countries tend to redistribute
less than other EU countries when one considers tax, social security contributions and
social benefits altogether. Bulgaria and Estonia display both the lowest average and
marginal tax rates and are significantly below the EU average. On the opposite side,
Hungary has a higher average tax rate and a lower marginal tax rate compared to the EU
average. Table 3 displays also the redistributive effect of the tax and benefit systems
measured through the Reynolds-Smolensky index, i.e. the difference between the Gini
indices of original income and disposable income. Only Hungary displays a level of
redistribution comparable to the EU average. All other countries appear to be ranked


















Personal income tax Employees' SSC Employers' SSC and payroll taxes
Figure 1. Composition of the implicit tax rate on labor in the EU, 2017 (%).
Source: Commission Services.
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Hence, while a certain level of progressivity exists through tax allowances and tax credits
and social benefits in the countries considered here, the degree of progressivity of flat tax
countries remains significantly below the one of other EU countries featuring a progressive tax
system. This is an important consideration in particular when progressive tax reforms are
complemented with tax credits, e.g. working tax credits, in order to reduce the disincentive
effect on labor supply. We will consider this aspect more specifically in the following section.
3. Progressive Tax Reforms Scenarios
As shown previously, CEE countries tend to have higher inequalities in disposable income and
a lower redistributive impact of their tax and social benefit systems. In this section, we consider
whether progressive tax reforms can possibly reduce inequalities, in particular accounting for
the existence of tax allowances and tax credits in the actual systems. There is a wide range of
possible scenarios that one could consider, not least because countries have different institu-
tional features which might make them more inclined to consider specific policy options rather
than others. In order to be able to compare results across countries, we study relatively standard
policy reform options introducing/increasing progressivity in the tax schedule.
In a first instance, we analyze the impact of a progressive tax reform without compensating
measures. We then consider a first compensating measure introducing a working tax credit in
order to reduce the potential disincentive effects of the progressive tax reform on labor supply.
This second reform scenario is budget neutral, by contrast with the first one. Finally, as an
alternative to the progressive tax reform, we also consider an introduction/increase in the basic
tax allowance while keeping the flat tax system. We believe the reform scenarios considered
below are general enough in order to accommodate countries´ specific circumstances and
institutional features reported in Table 2. The three scenarios considered are defined as follows:
● Scenario (I): we keep the existing PIT flat rate as the second rate of the progressive
PIT system. For the first rate, we reduce it by 5 pp and for the top rate we increase it
by 7 pp. The first income threshold is set to 33% of the average net taxable income,10
while the second is equal to the average net taxable income.
● Scenario (II): the extra PIT revenues are used to lower the tax burden of the low wage
earners, by introducing a refundable in-work tax credit for employees and self-employed.
Table 3. Statistics on effective tax rates, inequality and redistributive effects of tax and benefit systems,
2017.
Effective tax rates (%) Gini indices Redistributive effect
Average Marginal Disposable income Original income Reynolds-Smolensky index Ranking in EU
BG 15.9 22.4 0.359 0.502 0.144 28
EE 16.4 23.0 0.330 0.494 0.164 25
HU 27.4 34.5 0.289 0.499 0.210 14
LT 17.5 25.4 0.371 0.539 0.168 24
LV 23.0 30.5 0.350 0.498 0.148 27
RO 20.4 34.6 0.365 0.543 0.179 21
EU 22.9 35.1 0.295 0.505 0.210 -
Source: EUROMOD web statistics and authors’ calculations.
Note: Average and marginal effective tax rates are calculated considering the sum of income taxes, social contributions
paid by individuals and social benefits. Pensions are considered as part of social benefits. Arithmetic averages are
reported for the whole EU.
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The tax credit is phased-in up to 10% of the average gross earnings. Between 10% and 20%
of gross earnings, an eligible worker can benefit of the maximum amount (6.5% of average
gross earnings). Above this income threshold, the tax credit is gradually withdrawn.
● Scenario (III): we simulate an introduction/increase in the basic tax allowance,
compensated by an increase in the flat PIT rate. A tapering-off in the allowance is
introduced in Estonia, and a general tax allowance with a phasing-out design is
applied in Bulgaria and Hungary. The amount of the basic tax allowance is set to
equal the minimum gross wage (except Estonia, where an actual proposal is used).
Budget neutrality is ensured in scenarios (II) and (III). All simulations are conducted
using the EUROMOD microsimulation model for the year 2017 and data from EU-SILC
survey of 2015 (using as income reference 2014). The data is updated using relevant price
and wages indices. Appendix A provides more details on the EUROMOD model and the
EU-SILC data.
3.1. Scenario (I): Introducing a Progressive Personal Income Tax Schedule
The reference values for the tax brackets are calculated based on the distribution of net
taxable bases observed in the EU-SILC sample used in EUROMOD.11 Using the taxable
income net of allowances ensures that we are calculating the progressive PIT liabilities on
the same base as in the actual flat tax system. The tax brackets are therefore defined in
a consistent way across countries, allowing for a better comparability of the results. The
first income bracket is set to 33% of the average net taxable income, while the second is
equal to the average net taxable income. The progressive PIT design (rates and brackets)
are provided in Table 4.
Figures 2, 3 and online Appendix C summarize the results of these simulations as
a percentage change from the 2017 baseline scenario. In this scenario, a progressive PIT
schedule increases total tax revenues. It reduces the average disposable income of the richest
households. The impact on PIT revenues is positive in all countries, with increases ranging
from 6.2% in Latvia to 13.8% in Hungary. All countries experience a fall in the Gini index
ranging from a low −0.77 pp in Romania to a high −1.34 pp in Hungary. At-risk-of-poverty is
also reduced from −0.08 pp in Hungary to −0.53pp in Latvia. In all countries, these reforms
result in increased implicit tax rates on labor on average. However, for low income deciles, the
impact on the tax burden is negative. Disposable income increases for most income deciles in
the six Member States, especially for the middle of the distribution. However, the average
disposable income decreases, because the fall in income of the richest households exceeds the
Table 4. Simulated progressive PIT rates and income brackets.
BG EE HU LT LV RO
Currency BGN EUR HUF EUR EUR RON
Average net taxable income‡* 716 848 97,182 763 560 1,355
33% of average net taxable income‡* 239 283 32,070 254 187 452
1st PIT rate 5% 15% 11% 10% 18% 11%
2nd PIT rate (existing) 10% 20% 16% 15% 23% 16%
3rd PIT rate 17% 27% 23% 22% 30% 23%
‡ Monthly values
* EUROMOD estimate
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income gains of the rest of the population. The share of winners and losers is clearly skewed in
all countries in favor of the former, with the top income deciles bearing the bulk of the
increased tax burden, excepting in Hungary where the shares of winners and losers is broadly
balanced.
3.2. Scenario (II): Progressive Personal Income Tax with a Refundable Earned
Income Tax Credit
In this scenario the extra PIT revenues obtained in Scenario (I) are used to lower the tax
burden of the low wage earners. A refundable in-work tax credit is introduced only for
employees and self-employed. The in-work tax credit is designed as follows: for income up
to 10% of the average gross earnings, the phase-in slope is set to 0.65 (in other words, for
every euro earned, an individual receives 65 cents of tax credit). For income between 10%

























Figure 2. Impact on the mean annual equivalised disposable income by decile in Scenario (I) (difference
as % of 2017 baseline).
Source: Authors´ simulations based on the EUROMOD model.








Gini equivalised disposable income At-risk-of-poverty rate
Figure 3. Impact on inequality and the at-risk-of-poverty rate in Scenario (I) (difference as pp. of 2017
baseline).
Source: Authors´ simulations based on the EUROMOD model.
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amount of the tax credit. Above 20% of the average gross earnings, the tax credit is
gradually withdrawn at a different rate for each country. The maximum amount of the tax
credit is fixed to 6.5% of average gross earnings (0.65 phase-in slope x 0.1 first income
threshold), while the phasing-out slope is determined automatically by imposing budget-
neutrality conditions. For the countries with both withholding and final income tax
liabilities (Estonia and Lithuania12), the in-work tax credit is designed to be part only of
the final income tax liability.
The main parameters of the simulated refundable in-work tax credit are summarized in
Table 5.
Figures 4, 5 and online Appendix D summarize the results of this simulation as
a percentage change from the 2017 baseline scenario and depict the design of the tax credit
for each country. In this scenario, the additional introduction of a refundable in-work tax
credit – that makes the overall reform budget-neutral – redistributes further from the higher
to the lower income deciles, by decreasing the tax burden of the low-wage earners.
All countries experience a larger fall in the Gini index (of equivalized household disposable
income) compared to Scenario 1 from a low −1.21pp in Bulgaria to a high −2.51pp in
Hungary. The reduction in at-risk-of-poverty is also more pronounced, from −1.06pp in
Lithuania to−2.79pp inHungary compared to the baseline. The implicit tax rates on labor falls
on average in Lithuania and Estonia but increases for all other countries. For low income
Table 5. Income brackets of the refundable in-work tax credit.
BG EE HU LT LV RO
Currency BGN EUR HUF EUR EUR RON
Average gross earnings‡* 894 1,084 179,742 767 812 1,703
10% of average gross earnings‡ 89 108 17,974 77 81 170
20% of average gross earnings‡ 179 217 35,948 153 162 341
Maximum amount of tax credit (fixed) ‡ 58 70.2 11,683 50.05 52.65 111
Phase-in slope (fixed) 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65


























Figure 4. Impact on the mean annual equivalised disposable income by decile in Scenario (II)
(difference as % of 2017 baseline).
Source: Authors´ simulations based on the EUROMOD model.
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deciles, the impact of these reforms on the implicit tax rate on labor is clearly reduced due to
the stronger progressive nature of the reform. The extra PIT revenues are used to lower the tax
burden of the low-wage earners, boosting the disposable income of the bottom decile. As
expected, the overall net budgetary effect is neutralized compared to Scenario (I) given the
counteracting effect of the tax credit.
3.3. Scenario (III): Introduction of a Tapered Basic Tax-free Allowance and Increase
in the Flat PIT Rate
In this scenario we simulate an increase in the basic tax allowance which is compensated
by an increase in the flat PIT rate in order to ensure budget neutrality. In case of an
existing phasing-out design, we do not apply any changes (as this is the case for Latvia,
Lithuania and Romania), while introducing it in the countries where a tapering off does
not exist (Estonia). In countries that do not have any basic allowance (Bulgaria and
Hungary), a basic tax allowance with a phasing out is introduced for employees.13 The
increased basic tax-free allowance is set to equal the minimum gross wage (except in
Estonia, where an actual proposal discussed in 2017 and entered into force in 2018 is
used). In countries where pensions are included in the taxable base and have a separate tax
allowance which is higher than the basic allowance (as in Latvia and Romania), the
allowance for pensioners is increased only if it is lower than the new basic tax allowance
(as this is the case for Latvia). Other specific allowances (e.g. for children, disabled, other
dependents, self-employed etc.) and tax credits remain unchanged. A more detailed
description of the existing and reformed basic tax allowances is provided in Tables 6, 7
and Appendix B.
Figure 6, 7 and online Appendix E summarize the results of this simulation as
a percentage change from the 2017 baseline scenario. In this scenario, country specific
features play an even larger role than in previous scenarios. This is due to the hetero-
geneity of the basic tax-free allowance across countries. The tapered allowance has the
largest impact both in terms of disposable income and inequality in the countries where
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Figure 5. Impact on inequality and the at-risk-of-poverty rate in Scenario (II) (difference as pp. of 2017
baseline).
Source: Authors´ simulations based on the EUROMOD model.
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the allowance was absent (as in Bulgaria and Hungary) or in those where the allowance
was increased substantially (as in Latvia and Estonia).14
All countries experience a fall in the Gini index although with less pronounced in Lithuania
(−0.26 pp) and Romania (−0.54 pp) which already applied tapered allowances. At-risk-of-
poverty is also reduced in all countries, but less than in Scenarios (I) or (II). In Latvia, there is
also a significant decrease in the at-risk-of-poverty rate (−2 pp), due to the pensioners’
allowance which almost doubles. The implicit tax rate on labor increases on average in
Estonia and Latvia and falls in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, and Hungary. The decline in
the tax burden is concentrated in the bottom and middle deciles, raising their disposable
income. Conversely, the top deciles experience a higher implicit tax rate, which reduces their
disposable income increases for most income deciles (especially so for the first deciles)
Table 6. Summary of existing basic tax allowances (BTA) and proposed simulations.
BG EE HU LT LV RO
Currency BGN EUR HUF EUR EUR RON
BTA is in place N Y N Y Y Y
Phase-out is in place N N N Y Y Y
Amount of existing BTA N 180 N 310 115 800
New BTA* 460 500* 127,500 380* 380 1,450
Gross minimum wage 460 470 127,500 380 380 1,450
TA for pensioners** N Y N N Y N
Amount of TA for pensioners N 255 N N 235 2,000
New amount of TA for pensioners N N*** N N 500 2,000
Note: * an increase is based on legislation which came into force since 2018.
** A “N” indicates that tax allowance for pensioners does not exist as pension incomes are not taxed.
*** The additional allowance for pensioners was abolished under 2018 legislation. Pensioners are entitled to the BTA.
Table 7. Change in PIT flat rate (percentage points).
BG EE HU LT LV RO
Existing PIT rate (%) 10 20 16 15 23 16
New PIT rate (%) 13.3 23.6 23 16 28.4 18
























Figure 6. Impact on the mean annual equivalised disposable income by decile in Scenario (III)
(difference as % of 2017 baseline).
Source: Authors´ simulations based on the EUROMOD model.
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although on average only for Latvia as the highest income deciles experience a fall in
disposable income.
4. Macroeconomic Analysis of the Budget-neutral Scenarios
We used a three-region QUEST model with tradable/non-tradable sectors and three types of
labor skills (low, medium and high) to simulate the macroeconomic effect of introducing/
increasing progressivity in the PIT systems in a budgetary neutral way for scenarios (II) and
(III). For each country, we implement two scenarios based on the inputs we received from the
precedingmicrosimulation analysis using EUROMOD. In order to combine the twomodels, we
follow the approach developed by Barrios et al. (2019). We harmonize the QUEST and
EUROMOD calibration in the baseline by using the labor supply elasticities, the main labor
supply statistics (employment, unemployment and inactivity rates), employee and employer paid
taxes and skill-premiums from the microsimulation model. The labor supply elasticities and the
non-participation rates have been estimated using EUROMOD and the labor supply model
described in Appendix A.2. Both statistics are shown in Table 8 by country and skill level. The
rest of the QUEST model is calibrated using national accounts statistics (EUROSTAT), para-
meters taken from the literature and from the estimated version of the model (Appendix
A provides further details on the QUEST model).
The changes in the implicit tax rates on the employee side, which are used to obtain the
policy shocks in the QUEST model, are presented in Table 9. As expected, the two reforms
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Figure 7. Impact on inequality and the at-risk-of-poverty rate in Scenario (III) (difference as pp. of 2017
baseline).
Source: Authors´ simulations based on the EUROMOD model.
Table 8. Calibration of labor supply elasticity and nonparticipation rates in QUEST (by skill level).
Labor supply elasticities Nonparticipation rates
Countries High Medium Low High Medium Low
BG 0.186 0.220 0.398 0.060 0.093 0.143
EE 0.152 0.198 0.221 0.044 0.048 0.053
HU 0.099 0.149 0.198 0.097 0.099 0.159
LT 0.158 0.220 0.297 0.048 0.091 0.094
LV 0.201 0.164 0.182 0.052 0.084 0.072
RO 0.211 0.270 0.368 0.115 0.198 0.248
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reduce the taxes paid by employees on labor income. We also observe that low-skilled
workers benefit relatively more from the tax cuts, especially in the case of the progressive
PIT and refundable earned income tax credit which has a stronger progressive nature.
The corresponding results by country are presented in Figures 8, 9 below and Tables
F.1 to F.12 in online Appendix F. The scenarios bring slightly positive effects in terms of
GDP across all scenarios due to higher overall employment. The long-run (20+ years)
GDP effects are ranging from +0.01% (RO) to +0.07% (LV) while the corresponding
employment effects are between +0.10% (RO) and +0.74% (LV) relative to the baseline.
Cutting taxes for low- (medium) skilled workers increases their incentives for being
employed as their net real wage increases. On the other hand, raising taxes on the high skilled
reduces their net real wage and lowers their employment rate. As low-skilled workers have lower
productivity compared to medium and high-skilled workers, there is a trade-off between the
higher employment rate benefiting low-skilled workers and the loss in high-skilled employment.
The aggregate output and employment impact of these opposing forces depends on two main
factors: the productivity differences between high-medium and low-skilled workers and their
labor supply elasticities. The smaller is the difference between the productivity of high, medium
and low – skilled workers and the higher (the lower) the labor supply elasticity of low (medium
and high) skilled workers w.r.t net wages, the larger will be the economywide employment effect
and the more positive the GDP effect. For all the countries considered, the estimated labor
supply elasticity of high-skilled workers in EUROMOD is significantly smaller compared to that
of the low-skilled. This means that high-skilled workers are typically less sensitive to the cut in
their net wages after a tax-hike than low-skilled workers, leading to slightly positive overall
employment and GDP effect at the aggregate level.
Table 9. Changes in implicit tax rates paid by employees.
Scenario (II) Scenario (III)
High Medium Low High Medium Low
BG
Baseline (%) 16.11 16.90 14.60 16.11 16.90 14.60
Reform (%) 15.72 14.36 11.15 16.20 14.64 11.41
Change (pp) −0.39 −2.54 −3.45 0.09 −2.25 −3.19
EE
Baseline (%) 13.32 11.78 11.00 13.32 11.78 11.00
Reform (%) 12.50 8.64 6.91 12.64 9.29 8.14
Change (pp) −0.82 −3.14 −4.10 −0.68 −2.49 −2.86
HU
Baseline (%) 27.16 26.43 24.83 27.16 26.43 24.83
Reform (%) 27.92 23.15 17.34 26.88 20.04 15.54
Change (pp) 0.76 −3.29 −7.49 −0.28 −6.39 −9.30
LT
Baseline (%) 14.91 12.28 10.43 14.91 12.28 10.43
Reform (%) 13.90 9.06 1.74 14.76 11.58 9.95
Change (pp) −1.01 −3.22 −8.69 −0.15 −0.70 −0.47
LV
Baseline (%) 21.88 20.03 17.94 21.88 20.03 17.94
Reform (%) 21.54 16.84 10.03 22.57 17.52 14.65
Change (pp) −0.34 −3.19 −7.91 0.70 −2.52 −3.29
RO
Baseline (%) 23.38 21.72 21.45 23.38 21.72 21.45
Reform (%) 24.00 20.85 20.38 23.73 20.38 19.96
Change (pp) 0.63 −0.87 −1.08 0.36 −1.34 −1.49
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It is important to note a number of caveats to the scope of this exercise. First, the positive
macroeconomic effects from introducing more progressivity in the tax system depend cru-
cially on the assumed productivity differences across skills and their labor supply elasticities.15
Second, while a higher tax on high earnings is less detrimental for labor supply compared to
that of the low-skilled, we do not take into account that progressive taxes can also decrease the
potential wage-premium from investing in further training and education. Lowering the skill-
(wage)-premium for higher education could lead to less investment in human capital, there-
fore, lower labor supply quality in the long-run. Third, a flat tax system can yield advantages in
terms of efficiency of tax administration and fighting against tax evasion, in particular as it is
often applied across the board to all taxes, not exclusively to income taxes. However, the recent


























Figure 8. Medium and long-term impact on employment (difference as % of 2017 baseline).


























Figure 9. Medium and long-term impact on GDP (difference as % of 2017 baseline).
Source: Authors´ simulations based on the QUEST model.
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this evidence has considered tax reforms moving from a progressive to a flat tax system while
actually little is known for reforms going in the opposite direction. Fundamental tax reforms,
as the ones considered in this paper, are usually accompanied by reforms of tax collection
systems, tax enforcement rules and penalties.
In the next step of our macroeconomic analysis, we input the impulse responses for
employment, gross real wages and consumer price index generated by the QUEST model
back into the microsimulation model, in order to assess the medium-term projections in PIT
revenues. In addition, we simulate a second scenario in which the second-round effects, i.e. the
macroeconomic feedback and behavioral response to the tax change, are disregarded.
We analyze both scenarios (II) and (III) over the period 2018–2022 and compare the
variation in tax revenues against the baseline. More precisely, we apply the tax system of the
baseline policy year 2017 to the subsequent five years and we assess the fiscal impact of the tax
reforms embedding the second-round effects by amending the uprating factors and the weights
in the householdmicro-data according to themacroeconomic feedback provided by theQUEST
model for prices, employment and gross wages16 (online Appendix F). This is done as follows:
(1) We incorporate the macroeconomic impact of the tax reforms on employment by
adapting the EUROMOD input dataset to accommodate the QUEST trajectories for
the medium-term. In order to do so, we create micro-datasets for each year of
analysis. For each skill group, the weights of the employed are increased/decreased
according to the corresponding impulse response, while the weights of the unem-
ployed are scaled down/up, keeping the total population constant. In this way, the
employment effect estimated in QUEST is fully implemented as an extensive
margin effect in the household micro-data.
(2) The impulse response for the consumer price index is integrated in EUROMOD as
a correction of the corresponding uprating factor.
(3) For gross wages we apply the same approach as for the CPI, with the only exception
of having uprating factors for each skill category.
We subsequently run the microsimulation model to quantify the overall budgetary effects of
the reform scenarios (II) and (III) under the two alternatives: one embedding and the second
disregarding the behavioral response to the tax changes. The microsimulation results are
presented in detail in Figures F.1 and F.2 of online Appendix F. Note that, since the reforms
are designed to be budgetary neutral, the behavioral impact on the total PIT revenue is negligible,
reaching a maximum of 1 pp. for Latvia compared to the static scenario (given the more
significant effects on employment and gross wages for all skill groups). Incorporating the
macro impact of the tax reforms in EUROMOD slightly decreases revenues from personal
income taxes17. This is mainly due to the fact that the increases in employment for the largest
share of employees (the middle and the low skilled) are offset by the decline in their gross
wages.18
5. Conclusions
Flat tax systems can theoretically bring advantages in terms of tax administration and tax
compliance, employment and overall macroeconomic performance. However, such systems
are also known to be less redistributive. This question has been increasingly debated in Central
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and Eastern European countries with flat tax systems where income inequalities are generally
higher than in the rest of the European Union.
The existing literature brings a number of theoretical and empirical results about the
advantages and drawbacks of flat vs. progressive tax systems. Yet, these general arguments
have, to date, only been considered on a country by country basis, or considering specific
aspects of flat tax systems on a cross-country basis such as for instance tax compliance or labor
supply effects. A comparison of the relative merits of both flat vs. progressive tax systems in
a comprehensive manner i.e., considering both the redistributive and macroeconomic effects
is yet missing. Such comparison is difficult, especially from an empirical perspective. One first
reason is that countries differ in their institutional and economic structures. It is therefore
difficult to draw general conclusions from a cross-country comparison. A second reason lies in
the fact that there is actually no perfect “flat tax system”, i.e., flat tax countries usually adopt
basic tax allowances or tax credits benefiting low income households. In this paper we address
these questions from an empirical perspective accounting for the complexities of existing flat
tax systems and comparing their redistributive and macroeconomic properties against coun-
terfactual progressive tax systems. Our analysis brings novel cross-country results. This is
possible thanks in particular to the specific features of the EUROMOD microsimulation
model which allows considering tax systems in a comparable way across countries (in
particular with regard to the definition of the pre-tax gross income) and incorporating the
effect of tax allowances and tax credits on household disposable income.
We analyze the fiscal, redistributive and macroeconomic impact of introducing/increasing
progressivity in the Central and Eastern European countries with flat tax schedules, namely
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Romania. In order to do so, we use and
combine microsimulation and macro-models. Our results suggest that enhancing progressive
elements in the personal income tax system under alternative and plausible tax reform scenarios
would have significant positive effects on redistribution and equity and would yield additional
tax revenues. Budget neutral reforms combining progressive personal income tax systems with
a working tax credit or complementing a (higher) flat tax rate with tax allowances would yield
similar results and would lead to further reduction in income inequality. However, there are
substantial variations of results across countries depending on the existence of (pre-reform) tax
allowances and tax credits. In the medium-term, the macroeconomic impact of the budget-
neutral reforms appears to be positive, albeit small, for all countries.
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to analyze within the same framework
the macroeconomic and redistributive impact of progressive tax reforms in flat tax countries.
A number of important related questions have not been considered and could be explored in
future research using the same approach. For instance future research could potentially
account for the role of tax compliance and tax administration when comparing flat vs.
progressive tax systems. This would however require the availability of comparable estimates
on tax evasion across income deciles and across countries together with reliable estimates on
the behavioral impact of tax reforms on income underreporting. Another relevant question,
not addressed in this paper, concerns the role of progressive tax systems regarding income
insurance and income stabilization. Under progressive tax systems, automatic stabilization
might be improved which, in case of adverse economic shock, can potentially help smoothing
the impact of economic downturns. This property of progressive tax systems might be gauged
against their potential adverse effects on labor supply which might slow down economic
recovery. These questions could be addressed in future research.
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Notes
1. A joint or individual treatment between spousal earnings could in principle make an important
difference in the welfare gains obtained from a progressive versus a flat tax schedule. Accordingly,
under joint of family taxation, the secondary earner would pay a higher marginal tax rate under
a progressive tax compared to a flat tax schedule, with potentially distortive effects on labor
market participations, especially for women. By contrast, under an individual taxation system, the
secondary earner would face a lower marginal tax rate under a progressive rather flat rate tax
schedule. However, in practice, a flat tax system could also accommodate joint taxation, as for
instance in the case of Estonia (see Table 2).
2. According to Diamond and Saez (2011), working tax credits should be phased out with high
marginal tax rates in order to reduce the potential disincentive effects on labor supply. Taxes
should then be lower in the middle income ranges and increase toward the top of the income
distribution.
3. The extensive margin of labor supply measures the disincentive for people to take up a job.
By contrast, the intensive margin measures the number of hours worked.
4. Using EUROMOD and considering the cases of Finland, France and Germany, Bargain and
Orsini (2006) show in particular that the positive effects of working tax credits on single women is
offset by the negative effects the policy has on the labor participation of married women.
5. Following Immervoll and Pearson (2009) the existence of minimum wage can prevent
working tax credit from being “captured” by employers through lowering wages.
6. On January 1st 2018, Latvia implemented a progressive tax system and, a year later, Lithuania
introduced a second PIT rate. However this does not affect our analysis as we focus on the
2017 tax systems.
7. The Czech Republic also had a flat tax schedule, but is excluded from the analysis due to the
fact that it applies an additional 7% solidarity tax on gross income exceeding a certain
threshold.
8. In 2018, Estonia introduced an income dependent tax allowance. In Romania, the family
composition is accounted for in the basic tax allowance.
9. Tax expenditures constitute foregone government revenue through preferential tax provi-
sions (e.g. exemptions, allowances, deductions, credits) applied to specific groups, with the
aim to promote social or economic policies.
10. The net taxable income is defined as the gross taxable income minus applicable allowances.
11. We chose to use the EU-SILC sample for the calculation of the reference values of the tax
brackets since the gross earnings reported in the official statistics would hide variability in
taxable bases due to the impact of the existing tax allowances on the calculation of the PIT
liabilities.
12. The taxable base for the final tax is broader than the one for thewithholding tax. The tax base for the
final tax liability includes also incomes from self-employment, rent, property sale and royalties,
deductible expenses and some additional or unused tax allowances. Gross incomes net of with-
holding tax are used for simulation of the social assistance and other means-tested benefits.
13. The self-employed in Hungary are subject to a different tax scheme, while in Bulgaria they
already benefit of a basic tax allowance.
14. Inequality is measured using Gini index of equivalized disposable income. Equivalised
disposable income is calculated dividing household disposable income by the modified
OECD equivalence scale.
15. We rely on the skill-specific relative earnings and employment rates to determine the skill-
specific productivity differences.
16. Tables F.1 to F.12 of online Appendix F display the QUEST projections for net real wages,
while the trajectories for gross real wages are used in this step.
17. The trajectory of the PIT revenues in the scenarios disregarding the behavioral reactions is
given by how the budget-neutrality constraint is implemented, i.e. marginally revenue-
increasing or decreasing.
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18. The reform generates opposing responses in wages and employment. Decreasing (increasing)
labor income taxes paid by employees will lead to higher (lower) employment of the target
group, but it also exerts a downward (upward) pressure on their gross wages. These counter-
acting forces mitigate the effect on the tax base. Barrios et al. (2019) show that this is not the
case when employer-paid taxes are cut. Decreasing employer paid taxes results in higher labor
demand coupled with an upward pressure on the gross wages. As both employment and gross
wages increase in this case, the tax-base is rising and the behavioral (second-round) effects on
tax revenues can be substantial.
19. We use the latest available version “H.034+” of EUROMOD together with the datasets based
on the 2015 version of EU-SILC. For the simulation of the tax reforms, we choose 2017 tax-
benefit rules as the baseline. This is the most recent policy year that can be simulated with
EUROMOD at the time of writing this paper.
20. Some contributory benefits (e.g., pensions as well as unemployment or disability benefits) are
not simulated but taken directly from the EU-SILC data, given the lack of individual
contribution histories that would be needed to simulate them.
21. Examples of uprating factors are consumer price indices and evolution of earnings and
statutory adjustment rules for certain benefits.
22. By using the ISCED education classification, we define the share of population with lower
secondary education (ISCED 0–2) as low-skilled, with up to upper secondary and non-tertiary
education (ISCED 3–4) as medium skilled and the rest of the population as high-skilled.
23. The tables provided include only the changes in the general allowance and abolishment of the
pensioners’ tax allowance.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Description of the models
A.1 The microsimulation model EUROMOD and EU-SILC data
EUROMOD is a tax-benefit microsimulation model covering all 28 member states of the European
Union. The model is a static tax and benefit calculator that makes use of representative microdata
from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey to simulate individual
tax liabilities and social benefit entitlements according to the rules in place in each member state.19
Starting from gross incomes contained in the micro data, EUROMOD simulates most of the (direct)
tax liabilities and (noncontributory) benefit entitlements, and calculates household disposable
incomes.20 The model is unique in its area as it integrates taxes, social contributions and benefits
in a consistent framework, thus accounting for interactions between the tax and benefits systems
which – in the European case – can have a non-negligible impact in terms of tax revenues,
disposable income distribution and also in terms of work incentives. However, EUROMOD is
“static” and only delivers the first-round effects of the simulations. It does not take into account the
behavioral response of individuals to a given policy change. Long-term policy effects are also not
addressed with this model.
EUROMOD uses the latest available EU-SILC data. EU-SILC collects information on socio-
demographic characteristics, income sources, employment status, and gross income for all members
of the private households selected into the sample as well as information on household composition.
The income reference period in EU-SILC is the year preceding the survey. The EU-SILC data
include information on personal and household characteristics, several types of income (e.g., market
income, pensions or social transfers), certain expenditures (e.g., housing costs or life insurance
payments), and other variables related to living conditions. The validity of the simulated aggregates
is ensured by comparison with the corresponding macroeconomic estimates provided by national
tax authorities or by statistical institutes. Validation tables are offered in the EUROMOD country
reports for the EU-28 Member States, which can be found at https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-
euromod/country-reports. A more detailed description of the EUROMOD model can be found in
Sutherland and Figari (2013).
In order to align monetary values with the policy year of interest 2017, indices such as the
consumer price index and statutory adjustment rules (e.g., for pensions and social benefits) are
applied to update income components to the policy year of interest. These index variables are called
uprating factors and are usually taken from Eurostat (the European statistics agency) or national
statistical offices.21 In the context of this paper, uprating factors are also used for including general
equilibrium effects in EUROMOD. This way skill- specific indices are taken from the QUEST model
(e.g. after a policy chocks) and included back into EUROMOD in order to obtain the final impact of
reforms on tax revenues.
A.2 The labor supply model and the macroeconomic DSGE model QUEST III
The labor supply micro-econometric model, from which labor supply elasticities and number of
non-participants are estimated, follows closely Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014). This is a discrete
choice labor supply model where individuals face a set of alternatives in terms of working hours,
including the possibility of supplying zero hours in the labor market. Probabilities of supplying each
of those alternatives are then estimated in order to maximize a utility function, depending on
consumption, leisure and individual/household characteristics. Using this model we obtain the
labor supply elasticities reported in Table 8.
The macroeconomic model used in this analysis is an extension of the European Commission’s
New-Keynesian model, QUEST (to be precise: version QUEST III, see Ratto, Roeger, and In’t Veld
2009), to include different skilled workers. The QUEST model is the standard model used by the
European Commission to analyze the impact of fiscal scenarios and structural reforms in the EU
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Member States (see for instance Vogel 2012, In ‘t Veld 2013; Varga and In ‘t Veld 2014). As a fully
forward-looking DSGE model, QUEST can capture the behavioral responses of major macroeco-
nomic variables in an open economy context, going beyond the direct, static impact of specific tax
reforms measured by EUROMOD. The labor market modeled in QUEST is strongly based on
microeconomic theory and sufficiently general to adapt to the different labor market institutions of
the EU countries.
More specifically, the model-version used for this exercise is a three-region open-economy
model, calibrated for the country of interest, the (rest of) euro area and the rest of the world. For
each region, the model economy is populated by households and final goods producing firms. There
is a monetary and fiscal authority, both following rule-based stabilization policies. The domestic and
foreign firms produce a continuum of differentiated goods under monopolistic competition. In
order to measure the distributional consequences of policies we introduce three skill groups – high,
medium and low – into the model earning different wages.22
Appendix B. Description of the existing and reformed tax allowances
There are no basic allowance schemes in Hungary and Bulgaria. In Lithuania, there is the general tax
allowance applied to employment-related income (salary, bonuses, sickness allowances, holiday payments,
maternity, paternity allowances, etc.). The monthly general tax allowance is 310 EUR per month if tax
payer’s monthly gross income does not exceed 380 EUR (see Table B1). If income is higher, the monthly
general allowance is calculated using following formula = 310–0.5x (monthly employment-related
income – 380).
The proposal for the 2018 is to increase the main amount up to current minimum gross wage
(380). The monthly general allowance will be calculated using following formula = 380–0.5x
(monthly employment-related income – 400). This reform was implemented in our simulations.
Estonia has the basic tax allowance which equals 180 EUR per month (2160 per year) and has no
phasing out. There are no income limits to receive this allowance. The simulated reform is based on
the proposal for the 2018. The basic allowance is increased to 500 EUR per month (6000 per year),
phase out is introduced, pensioners’ additional allowance is abolished (pensioners are entitled to the
general tax allowance). For budget neutrality, the PIT needs to be increased from 20 to 23.6%.
If also an additional tax allowance for married couples is introduced, this would result in an
additional increase of the PIT rate up to 25.3%.23





BTA = 310–0.5x (monthly employment-related
income – 380).
380€/month (4,560€/year)
BTA = 380–0,5 x (monthly employment-related
income – 400).
Table B2. Design of existing and reformed tax allowances in Estonia.
Baseline 2017 Reform








Introduction of phase out of the basic tax free allowance n/a 0 – 1,200€ 500€/month
1,200–2,100 € (2,100 – x) * 0.5556
> 2,100 € 0
Pensioners’ tax allowance 236€/month
(2,832€/year)
0€/month
Introduction of an additional allowance* n/a 2160/year if joint income≤50400 year.
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In Latvia, there is the basic non-taxable income allowance which is applied to employees or self-
employed people who do not receive old-age or disability pensions. Pensioners are eligible for a higher
non-taxable minimum income allowance. As of 2016, there is a phase out (see Table B3 and the formula
below the table). In the reform the basic amount of the tax allowance was increased up to the gross
minimum wage, while the brackets were left unchanged. Pensioners’ allowance was increased by the
same nominal amount as the maximum tax allowance (by 265 EUR up to 500EUR per month).
The phase out (withdrawal rate) is calculated according to the following formula:
R ¼ TAmax  TAmin  12
Ylim1  Ylim2
where R is the withdrawal rate, TAmax is the maximum amount of tax allowance (EUR per year),
TAmin is the minimum amount of tax allowance (EUR per month), Ylim1 is income level above
which the minimum allowance is applied (EUR per year) and Ylim2 is income level below which the
maximum allowance is applied (EUR per year).
In Romania, there is a tax allowance for oneself and allocated dependents. It is a personal
deduction which is given to employees who have a monthly gross wage under or equal to 3,000
RON. The amount of the deduction is a function of the number of taxpayer’s dependent persons
(see Table B4). The dependent person can be the spouse, child or other family relative up to the 2nd
degree (children, parents, brothers and sisters, grandparents and grandchildren) of the taxpayer or
his/her spouse’s with a gross taxable and non-taxable income which does not exceed 300 RON.
If the gross wage is between 1,501 and 3,000 RON, the personal deduction is decreasing with
income and its amount is established by applying the following formula:
Personal deduction = Personal deduction (gross wage ≤1,500 RON) * [1-(Gross wage – 1,500)/1,500]
In the reform scenario, the maximum amount of the employee tax allowance has been increased to
the minimum gross wage (1,450 RON), while the brackets and the phase-out slope were left
unchanged. The tax allowance for pensioners was also unaltered, as their maximum deduction
continues to remain superior to the employee tax allowance.
From January 1st, 2018 the standard deduction on employment income will be increased to 510
RON per month and the deduction for dependents to 160 RON per month.
Table B3. Design of existing and reformed tax allowances in Latvia.
Baseline 2017 Reform
Maximum amount of the basic tax allowance 115€/month 380€/month
Income below which the maximum allowance is applied 400€/month 400€/month
Minimum amount of the basic tax allowance 60€/month 60€/month
Income above which minimum allowance is applied 1,100€/month 400€/month
Pensioners’ tax allowance 235€/month 500€/month
Table B4. Design of existing and reformed tax allowances in Romania.
Baseline 2017 Reform
Maximum amount of the employee tax allowance 800 RON/month 1,450 RON/month
Standard deduction on employment income 300 RON/month 550 RON/month
Deduction for dependents on employment income 100 RON/month 180 RON/month
Pensioners’ tax allowance 2,000 RON/month 2,000 RON/month
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